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Labour constraints on choosing profitable products for part-time 
farmers in Swiss agriculture 
Abstract 
Based on a conceptual framework, we develop the hypothesis that part-time farmers invest in 
less  profitable  products  than  full-time  farms,  due  to  the  necessary  minimum  labour 
requirements which entering and running profitable production processes require. Descriptive 
statistics for Swiss farms show some indications for this hypothesis, like a much lower total 
revenue and lower agricultural income of part-time farms, despite a comparable value of the 
farm’s assets. A regression analysis for the period 1996-2005 confirms that Swiss part-time 
farms tend to focus on products with low labour profitability. This may explain why part-time 
farming in Switzerland is less developed than in most other European countries, and raises the 
question whether part-time farming offers a solution for structural change process in small-
structured agricultural systems affected by imperfections on factor markets. 
Keywords: farms, part-time, profitability, Switzerland 
JEL classification: Q12 
 
Le temps de travail disponible limite l'engagement des agriculteurs pluriactifs suisses 
dans des productions rentables 
Résumé 
Grâce à un modèle conceptuel, nous développons l’hypothèse que les exploitants agricoles 
pluriactifs investissent dans des productions moins rentables que ne le font les exploitants à 
plein temps, en raison des exigences minimales de travail que nécessitent les technologies de 
productions les plus profitables. Des statistiques descriptives pour les exploitations suisses 
semblent confirmer cette hypothèse, comme par exemple un revenu agricole plus faible pour 
les exploitations pluriactives malgré une valeur comparable de capital utilisé. Une régression 
économétrique pour la période 1996-2005 confirme que les exploitations pluriactives suisses 
sont  plutôt  engagées  dans  des  productions  à  faible  profitabilité  par  unité  de  travail.  Ceci 
pourrait expliquer pourquoi l’agriculture pluriactive est moins développée en Suisse que dans 
la plupart des autres pays européens. La question se pose alors si l’agriculture pluriactive est 
vraiment une alternative au changement structurel dans les systèmes agricoles de petite taille 
lorsque ceux-ci font face à des imperfections sur les marchés des facteurs. 
Mots-clefs : exploitations agricoles, pluriactivité, profitabilité, Suisse 
Classification JEL : Q12 Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°  08-03 
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Labour constraints on choosing profitable products for part-time 
farmers in Swiss agriculture 
 
1.  Introduction 
Small-structured  agriculture  has,  for  a  long  time,  been  seen  as  unambiguously  inefficient 
(Brandes, 1978; Koester, 1979; Johnson, 1982). This view has been challenged since some 
seminal work by Schmitt (1988; 1989). Schmitt emphasized the difference between farm and 
household income. He showed how combining off- and on-farm income could be a utility-
maximizing strategy, because working only partly on one’s farm could attain a high marginal 
productivity until decreasing to the marginal productivity of off-farm labour. He concluded 
that “resource allocation in agriculture is an efficient one” (Schmitt, 1989; 1273 f.). Even 
earlier, Lee (1965) had developed a first model to show the rationality of part-time farming. 
This theoretical framework is challenged by the Swiss situation. Analyses by FAT (2002) 
have  shown  a  very  low  agricultural  income  per  full-time  worker  on  part-time  farms.  In 
addition, the share of part-time farms in Switzerland is at 28 per cent and by far lower than in 
most neighbour countries where it is often above 50 per cent. More remarkably, the rate of 
structural  change  among  part-time  farms  (-3.6  per  cent  p.a.  between  2000  and  2005)  is 
considerably  higher  than  for  full-time  farms  (-1.4  per  cent  p.a.).  This  means  that  the 
difference in the part-time share in Switzerland’s agriculture to its neighbour countries is 
likely to grow. This raises the question about possible constraints that limit the attractiveness 
of part-time farming under Swiss conditions. 
Particularly  Austrian  economists  (Pfaffermayr  et  al.,  1991;  Weiss,  1997)  have  shown  the 
responsiveness  of  off-farm  labour  to  the  labour  market  and  thereby  apparently  confirmed 
Schmitt’s  theory.  Similarly,  Huffman  (1980)  showed  how  improving  farmers’  education 
would increase off-farm labour supply. However, Juvancic and Erjavec (2005) indicated that 
there are constraints with respect to the participation of farmers in the off-farm labour market. 
While  distortions  and  constraints  on  the  labour  market  have  been  relatively  thoroughly 
analyzed, on-farm labour constraints have been neglected in the attempt to understand the 
nature of part-time farming. While factor constraints are usually not seen as being of major 
importance in reasonably large-structured farming sectors such as in the United States (US) 
(Ahearn et al., 2004), this may well be different in agricultural systems as Switzerland where 
high subsidies have contributed to maintain an average farm size of 19 hectares. Another Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°  08-03 
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difference to the situation in the US (Hanson, 1996) is that part-time farms in Switzerland are, 
on average, considerably smaller than full time farms. This is not always by free decision, but 
farm  expansion  in  Switzerland  is  constrained.  Obstacles  to  farm  growth  are  particularly 
prevalent  at  the  land  market  which  is  characterized  by  high  prices  and  low  availability 
(Giuliani, 2002). Other barriers may be the availability of capital for major investments, also 
because of the mediocre income situation of most family farms. As few farms rely on hired 
labour,  the  labour  supply  of  family  farms  is  usually  fixed.  Thus,  there  may  well  be  a 
mismatch between the availability of “excess supply of labour in agriculture” (Schultz, 1945; 
91) and the availability of other factors, a mismatch which can only be balanced by offering 
labour outside of the farm. 
This paper investigates how labour constraints limit part-time farmers’ choice of production 
activities. Farmers with such constraints may well be forced to stick to unprofitable product 
lines. Although there exist factor constraints in terms of limited machinery or stables, we 
focus on the constraints on labour force availability, that may prevent part-time  farms to 
produce what the market wants and what would be most profitable. This presumption is firstly 
explained with a conceptual framework in Section 2, and then tested empirically for Swiss 
farms,  for  which  the  method  is  outlined  in  Section  3.  Section  4  presents  the  results  and 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  Conceptual framework 
The conceptual framework presented below shows that it is likely that part-time farmers in 
Switzerland do not produce highly profitable (in terms of monetary productivity per labour) 
products, but are constrained to produce mainly low profitable products on their land. This is 
due to the fact that products with a high labour profitability usually require a minimum labour 
force, and that part-time farms cannot meet this minimum requirement.  
The  notion  of  minimum  labour  allocated  to  a  specific  production  activity  deals  with  the 
technical nature of agricultural production processes. There is always a proportion of factor 
requirements  that  are  fixed,  which  may  occur,  firstly,  when  entering  a  new  production 
activity, and secondly, during the production process of specific activities. Firstly, as shown 
by Mann et al. (2003), entering a production activity requires investment decisions in at least 
two respects. In order to start a new production activity, not only capital investments become 
necessary,  but  a  lot  of  human  capital  has  to  be  invested,  so  that  technologies  and  the Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°  08-03 
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organization of labour are known to the farmer. In a lot of instances, labour investments, but 
also.  These  fixed  factor  requirements  contribute  a  lot  to  the  persisting  phenomenon  of 
economies  of  scale  (Hallam,  1991;  Shah,  1992;  Langlois,  1997).  Mann  et  al.  (2003) 
additionally  showed  by  internationally  comparing  exit  rates  from  production  lines  that 
conservative farmers like in Switzerland tend to consider entering a new production process 
more  as  an  investment  compared  with  more  flexible  farmers  as,  for  example,  in  the 
Netherlands.  Secondly,  different  agricultural  products  have  different  minimum  labour 
requirements. Consider pig breeding as a case in point. This activity requires a relatively high 
minimum of labour time in order to become acquainted with the many complicated cycles and 
processes of piglet production (Knap et al., 2001). Once the business is running, a certain 
minimum number of hours have, at several stages of the breeding process, to be spent in order 
to keep animals healthy and to result in the desired number of piglets, independent of holding 
size. An example with a relatively low level of labour requirements, on the other hand, would 
be the production of spelt. Producers who are familiar with grain production in general do 
generally have little additional investments to do to enter the production of spelt. 
Our  conceptual  framework  is  mainly  graphical,  but  is  based  on  a  theoretical  objective 
program of farmers who may work or not off farm, and who have the possibility to produce 
two products with different labour profitability and requirements. We assume that product 1 
has a higher labour profitability than product 2, but necessitates a minimum labour force. 
The objective program for farmers is as follows 
1: 
( ) ( ) ( ) O X L X X p L X f p L X f p w + + - + = P 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 , , Max         (1) 
on  O L L L X X , , , , 2 1 2 1  
subject to 
( ) 1 1 1 1 1 , 0     for   f X L L L = <    (2) 
( ) ( ) 1 1 1 2 2 2
1 2
1 2






   (3) 
O L L L T + + = 2 1    (4) 
0 1 ³ L    (5) 
                                                 
1 For simplicity, a farmer is assumed to behave like a firm and not like a household (i.e. consumption and leisure 
are not considered).  Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°  08-03 
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0 2 ³ L    (6) 
0 ³ O L    (7) 
where 
P is the total farm (on-farm and off-farm) profit; 
  2 1, f f  are the production functions of respectively product 1 and product 2; 
2 1,L L  are labour times devoted to the production of respectively product 1 and product 2; 
2 1, X X  are other factors devoted to the production of respectively product 1 and product 2; 
X p p p , , 2 1  are the prices of product 1, product 2 and the other inputs, respectively. 
1 L  is the minimum labour allocated to the production of product 1. 
T  is the total time endowment;  
O L  is the time allocated to off-farm employment; 
w  is the off-farm wage. 
Constraint (2) represents the minimum labour requirement for the production of product 1, 
while constraint (3) shows that the marginal labour (financial) productivity of product 1 is 
greater than the one of product 2, therefore  representing the larger labour profitability of 
product 1. As for constraint (4), it is the time constraint. 
The case of a farmer producing both products is depicted on Figure 1. The horizontal axis of 
this figure shows the labour allocation to both products, the total length of the axis being the 
total time available to the farmer (T). The left, respectively right, vertical axis represents the 
profit generated from the production of product 1, respectively of product 2. Both production 
technologies  ( 1 1 p f   and  2 2 p f )  are  depicted,  with  the  production  technology  of  product  2 
starting at  2 0 L =  and the production technology of product 1 starting at  1 1 L L = . The larger 
labour profitability of product 1 than of product 2 (i.e. constraint (3)) is represented by a 
greater  slope  of  the  production  technology  of  product  1  than  of  product  2.  The  farmer’s 
objective is to maximize its total profit; the latter is maximized at point A, that is to say where 
the marginal labour productivities of both products are equal. From the farmer’s objective 
program  above,  the  optimal  point  A  is  represented  by  the  following  Kuhn  and  Tucker 
condition: Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°  08-03 
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( ) ( )
* *
1 1 2 2
1 2 0
1 2







   (8) 
0 m  being the Lagrange multiplier of constraint (7). 
At point A, the total profit generated is 
* *
1 2 P +P , which is greater than the maximum profit 
that could be generated if the farmer was producing product 1 only ( 1max P ) or product 2 
only ( 2 max P ). Thus, the farmer produces both products. 
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This is the case of a full-time farmer (all time is allocated to production: 
* *
1 2 T L L = + ). But 
the farmer may also work off farm, as represented by Figure 2. In the case depicted by this 
figure, the farmer’s off-farm labour allocation is 
*
O L , and both products are still produced 
(
* * *
1 2 O T L L L = + + ). In this case, the Kuhn and Tucker condition is: 
( ) ( )
* *
1 1 2 2
1 2
1 2







   (9) 
 
Figure 2: Graphical representation of labour allocation of a part-time farmer allocating 
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However, when a farmer allocates a large part of its time off farm, only product 2 may be 
produced, as depicted by Figure 3. In this case, the farmer is constrained in its time left for 
production. As shown on the figures, the profit from producing product 2 only ( 2 max P ) is 
greater  than  any  other  combination  (production  of  product  1  only,  or  production  of  both 
products). Thus, in this case, the farmer is better off not producing at all product 1, even 
though this product is more profitable than product 2. The Kuhn and Tucker conditions for 
product 1, respectively product 2 are: 

























   (11) 
l  being the Lagrange multiplier of constraint (2). 
 
Figure 3: Graphical representation of labour allocation of a part-time farmer allocating 
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3.  Method and data 
The above conceptual framework shows that farmers who allocate a large part of labour off 
farm may not be able to produce profitable products. Thus, in order to test this proposition, 
that part-time  farmers  will rather concentrate  on products  with a low labour profitability, 
Swiss farm level data from the Farm Accountancy Data Network (FADN) from the years 
1996-2005 were examined for 16 different production activities with a sufficient number of 
observations. One important issue is the definition of part-time farms. The practice that is 
most common in Middle Europe is to distinguish between farms where the household income 
comes mainly (i.e. above 50 per cent) from on-farm income and farms where income comes 
mainly from off-farm activities; in this paper we will call the first type of farms full-time 
farms and the second type of farms part-time farms. Since some of the so-called full-time 
farms are also part-time farms, it would be more accurate to define the latter as sideline farms. 
For simplicity reasons, however, we will stick to the labelling full-time and part-time farms. 
The “Labour Economics” Research Group from the Swiss Federal Research Station ART has 
available  detailed  labour  requirements  for  almost  all  farm  products  under  typical  Swiss 
conditions. With these figures, Standard Labour Requirements for each farm were calculated 
based on the farm’s production portfolio, both for single products (SLR) and for the total farm 
(FLR).  The  latter  figure  was  compared  by  the  total  labour  requirement  of  the  farm  as 
documented in its books (RLR) so that  
FLR
RLR
L =    (12) 
Real labour requirements for single product lines (R) were subsequently estimated by 
SLR L R ´ =    (13) 
Monetary labour productivity on a single-farm-level (Pf) was then calculated by monetary 
produced amounts, divided by R. Finally, average monetary labour productivity per product 








P   (14) 
where 
Wf is the weight of the single farm in accordance to FADN representativity, 
Af is the amount produced by the single farm, Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°  08-03 
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N is the number of farms involved. 
This modification of FADN data allows now to test empirically how the share of part time 
farms in each production activity can be explained. The explanation of the share of part-time 
farms in each production activity is now carried out by P, as described above. This means that 
we test whether the level of labour productivity of a farm product (explanatory variable of the 
regression) will influence the production level of part-time farms involved in delivering this 
product  (dependent  variable  of  the  regression).  Another  explaining  variable  is  the 
categorization into animal and crop activities, since there could be any systematic bias for 
part-time farmers to either of them. In order to allow for a changing share of part-time farms 
over time, a fixed-effect regression was applied. 
  
4.  Results 
The main differences between full- and part-time farms are illustrated in Table 1. In assets, 
acreage and particularly in number of animals, full-time farms outsize part-time farms. The 
most striking difference, however, is the income situation. While the agricultural income for 
full-time farms in Switzerland is slightly higher than the direct payments they receive, the 
opposite is true for part-time farms. Their agricultural income is at only 19,000 Swiss Franks 
per year. This is not only far too low to make a living under Swiss conditions, it is also not 
even the half of the governmental transfers they receive. This means that every production 
process  by  part-time  farms  seems  to  be  bound  to  make  economic  losses.  This  is  a  first 
indicator for the truth of our hypothesis. 
Looking at costs and revenues of full- and part-time farms, another indicator supports the 
hypothesis that only full-time farms manage to produce profitable products. With similar asset 
value  and  labour  use,  part-time  farms  only  manage  to  have  a  bit  more  than  half  of  the 
revenues which full-time farmers have. This means that not the high cost level is the chronic 
problem of Swiss part-time farms, because their cost level is even below the one of full-time 
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Table 1: Characteristics of full- and part-time farms in 2004 in Switzerland 
  Average for full-time 
farms 
Average for part-time 
farms 
Labour units  1.7  1.2 
Area farmed (hectares)  21  15 
Livestock units  28  17 
Assets (Swiss Franks)  783,000  634,000 
Direct payments (Swiss Franks)  50,000  40,000 
Total revenue (Swiss Franks)  240,000  143,000 
Total costs (Swiss Franks)  170,000  124,000 
Agricultural income (Swiss Franks)  70,000  19,000 
Non-agricultural income (Swiss Franks)  14,000  54,000 
 
The regression results presented in Table 2 show that the share of part-time farms is indeed 
influenced by the monetary productivity of the farm product. The more revenue per labour 
unit  is  generated  by  a  product,  the  less  part-time  farms  will  engage  in  its  production. 
However, the fact that an agricultural activity is connected cannot be shown to influence the 
engagement of part-time farms. 
Although the relatively low R
2 shows that many other factors which have not been identified 
yet are also responsible for the role that part-time farms play for sectoral production, the 
results confirms our hypothesis that part-time farmers tend to engage on products with a low 
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Table  2:  Explaining  the  share  of  part-time  farms  in  the  country’s  agricultural 
production in 1996-2005 in Switzerland 
Variable  Coefficient  t-value  Probability 
Monetary productivity per labour unit (P)  -0.0000000448  -2.05  0.026 
Animal activity (dummy)  0.0118  1.20  0.234 
Constant  0.1065  16.4  0.000 
R
2 = 0.03 
Number of observations: 157 
 
The results are illustrated by Table 3 which shows the part of products being provided by 
part-time  farms  in  Switzerland.  The  data  confirms  our  example  of pig breeding  which  is 
highly  profitable,  but  requires  a  certain  minimum  of  (time,  financial  and  intellectual) 
resources,  so  that  most  part-time  farmers  refrain  from  it.  There  are  other  examples  like 
potatoes, where similarly high entry barriers keep most part-time farmers off, but where the 
turnover per worker turns out to be rather low. Such cases may contribute to the low measure 
of determination in Table 2. As supposed in Section 2, spelt is the opposite example which is 










 Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°  08-03 
 
  14 
Table 3: Examples for the share of production by part-time farms and annual turnover 
per labour unit in 2004 in Switzerland, 2004 
Product  Share of the country’s 
agricultural production by 
part-time farms (%) 
Annual turnover / labour unit 
for all farms (Swiss Franks) 
Wheat  5.9  229,000 
Potatoes  6.1  94,000 
Pig breeding  8.1  357,000 
Milk  8.8  102,000 
Pig fattening  9.7  264,000 
Maize  9.7  147,000 
Barley  9.8  103,000 
Sugar beets  10.8  127,000 
Rapeseed  11.6  119,000 
Oat  12.8  98,000 
Sunflower  14.1  96,000 
Spelt  20.2  115,000 
Suckler cows  22.1  182,000 
 
 
5.  Conclusion 
Few of us have two different jobs. Many people balk at the thought of running through two 
different  educations  and  of  keeping  the  issues  of  importance  from  two  different  working 
places in their mind. If we are economists in the morning, we are unlikely to work at a travel 
agent  or  a  bakery  in  the  afternoon.  Conventional  wisdom  has  it  that  this  is  different  for 
agriculture.  From  the  literature  cited  above,  it  appears  as  if  monetary  labour productivity 
could be maximized through splitting ones’ personal labour resources between on-farm and 
off-farm activities. However, the existing literature has not investigated part-time farmers’ Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°  08-03 
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choices of production activities on their farm. Such choices are likely to be more constrained 
than those made by full-time farmers. 
Our hypothesis was that part-time farmers, due to their labour constraint on farm, do not 
engage is highly profitable products. The explanation is that such production activities have 
fixed  costs,  in  other  words,  they  require  fixed  time  requirements,  in  terms  of  learning, 
entering and running the activity. Our conceptual framework and our results for Swiss farms 
confirm the difficulties to enter attractive activities within agriculture if off-farm employment 
constitutes an important part of the household income. The smaller farms are, the clearer will 
these difficulties become.  Imperfectly functioning land and labour markets exacerbate the 
situation, as part-time farmers cannot overcome constraints on farm expansion and labour 
hiring. 
Therefore, Swiss farms, being very small in international comparisons anyway, are a good 
example for the disadvantages that arise for part-time farmers. It is therefore questionable 
whether part-time farming offers a solution for structural change process in small-structured 
agricultural systems affected by imperfections on factor markets. Working Paper SMART – LERECO N°  08-03 
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